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It is a  special privilege  for me  to be  here
with you today.  One  of the first professional
papers  I  ever  gave  was  at  these  meetings
(Schuh,  1963).  Much  has changed  since  the
occasion  of that  earlier  paper.  The  U.S.
economy  has  gone  through  a  period  of un-
precedented  sustained  economic  growth,
only  to tumble  into  the worst  economic  re-
cession of the post-World War II period.  Our
agricultural  sector  has  undergone  a  major
transformation  at  home,  while  finding  itself
increasingly integrated into a world economy
abroad.'  And,  after  a period  of virtual  aban-
donment  by  agricultural  and  general
economists  alike,  policy  issues  have now  re-
turned to a high position on our research  and
teaching agenda.
That agenda  is  rich with  opportunities,  for
we  have  many  challenges  before  us.  In  the
time allotted here today we can do little more
than scratch the surface  of some of the major
challenges.  I  make  no  pretense  at  being
comprehensive  or  exhaustive.  Rather,  I will
attempt  to  play  to  whatever  comparative
strength I might have.  That means  I will ne-
glect a great deal,  and much of what I neglect
may be judged  by others  to  be more impor-
tant  than  the  issues  I  have  chosen  to  con-
sider.
As  the title  suggests,  my focus  is on policy
challenges.  Under that rubric, I will consider
commodity  policy,  income policy,  trade  and
exchange  rate  policy,  and a  rhetorical  ques-
tion dealing with whether we can in fact have
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a food and agricultural  policy.  In addressing
these  issues,  I will  attempt  to  view  agricul-
ture  in  the  context  of  the  larger  economy,
and in the context of an economy that is sub-
stantially  more  open  to  international  eco-
nomic  forces than it has  been in the past.
Commodity  Policy
In  some  respects,  U.S.  commodity  pro-
grams have shown a surprising degree of con-
sistency over the years. Implicit in them have
been  two  important  goals:  (1) an  attempt  to
obtain  more  stability in  farm  prices than  un-
fettered free markets  would provide; and (2) a
desire to provide  income transfers  to farmers
through  what  is  perceived  by  them  as  the
market  place,  rather  than  to  provide  such
transfers  in more  direct form.
Despite  this  consistency,  there  has  been
considerable  evolution  in  some  commodity
programs.  For  one  thing,  we  have  turned
away  from  an  almost  complete  dependence
on the concept  of parity  prices  as  a guide to
price policy and  shifted  to  a  greater  depen-
dence  on  cost of production  as  a  guide.  Al-
though  obviously  not  an  unmitigated  bless-
ing,  I  believe  most  economists  would  agree
that  this  was  at  least  a  marginal  improve-
ment,  the political pressures  associated  with
this concept notwithstanding.
Second,  some  of the  programs have  been
modified  so  as  to  provide  a greater  range  in
which  market  forces  can  work.  Rather than
having  a relatively  fixed,  single-valued price
support  level,  some  of our  programs  now
have  differentiated  loan  levels  and  target
prices,  with  the  target  price  serving  as  the
basis  for  deficiency  payments  and  the  loan
level  in  effect  providing  a  price  floor.  This
approach  provides  a partial  disconnection  of
income  policy  from  price  policy.  It  enables
consumers  to  realize  some  of  the  benefits
when supply outruns demand.  It also reduces
the chance that we will price ourselves out of
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international  markets,  as we  did on occasion
in the past.  In fact,  it is notable that with the
exception of tobacco,  the price corridor con-
cept  is  now  used  on  precisely  those  com-
modities  for which international  markets  are
important.
Related  to  the use of price  bands or  price
corridors,  we also  now have  a more  explicit
reserve  policy.  In the  past,  we accumulated
rather  large  reserve  stocks  in  government
hands almost  entirely as  a by-product of our
price policies.  There was little intent to have
an  explicit  reserve  policy,  or  to  manage
stocks in a buffer-stock fashion.  Now there is
an  explicit reserve target  for wheat and feed
grains, and at least the intent to manage them
in true buffer-stock  fashion.  In fact, there are
explicit  trigger levels  at which the stocks will
be released  to the market.
Farmers also now have the flexibility in the
programs to shift among crops in response  to
changing  market  conditions.  This  is  in
marked contrast to the past, when use of rigid
acreage  allotments  and  marketing  quotas
kept them locked into a given production pat-
tern.  This  added  flexibility  which  the  set-
aside  program  provides  should  permit  a
more-efficient  use of resources.
Another evolution  in policy is the decision
to  participate  in  international  commodity
agreements.  This  is not new,  of course,  since
we  have  participated  in  commodity  agree-
ments  in the past.  However,  we  had turned
our backs on them for some time, and for the
most part took  a negative  view of what  they
could offer.
This  Administration  has  already  initialed
an International  Sugar Agreement.  Its ratifi-
cation  has  been  held  up  until agreement  is
reached  on domestic policy.  The Administra-
tion  has  also  been  involved  in  protracted
negotiations  on  an  International  Wheat
Agreement.  Our  objectives  in  such  an
agreement  are  to obtain  a greater  sharing of
adjustment costs among countries, and to ob-
tain greater stability in the international mar-
ket  for  wheat,  the  latter  to  be  obtained
through  the joint management  of nationally
held reserve stocks.
The final evolution of our policy is the im-
position  of  limits  on  the  size  of direct  pay-
ments  that  individual  farmers  receive  from
the  government.  Although  these limitations
have  probably had only  a minimal impact on
the distribution of income  and payment ben-
efits,  most observers would agree,  I believe,
that  this  development  has  improved  the
overall  equity of the programs,  when equity
is  evaluated  in  terms  of both  the  farm  pro-
ducer  and the taxpayer.
To  summarize,  both  the  1973  and  1977
legislation  have given  us  important  steps  to-
ward  evolving more rational commodity pro-
grams.  However,  we  still have  a number  of
important  policy  challenges  before  us.  Let
me address at least four of them.
1. Can we obtain more consistency in our
commodity  programs? Put  somewhat  more
amply,  can we obtain a more general discon-
nection  of income  policy  from price  policy?
Just enumerating  the commodities  for which
changes  would  be required  provides  a good
indication of the magnitude of the challenge.
To obtain consistency would require  changes
in the sugar program,  the dairy program,  the
tobacco  program,  and the peanut  program.
The  current  Administration  has  made  an
attempt to obtain changes in the sugar policy,
and now finds itself in an impasse with Con-
gress.  The Administration's  goal has been  to
introduce the concept of deficiency payments
into  sugar  policy  so  as  to  provide  income
support to producers  while  at the same  time
enabling consumers to benefit from the lower
prices  in international markets.  But a combi-
nation of factors weigh  against such  a policy.
The cost of production  is  high  in two  politi-
cally  important  states - Louisiana  for  cane
and Idaho for beets. In addition, there is con-
cern  on  the  part of producers  that  explicit
deficiency  payments  will  lead  to  payment
limitations.  And  finally,  the  producers  of
corn-sweeteners  now side with cane and beet
producers,  and argue for a general sweetener
policy that includes them, rather than a sugar
policy alone.
It now  appears  likely  that  we  will  take  a
step  backward  from  the  more  liberal  sugar
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policies of the recent past.  The danger is that
we  will go  all  the way  back to the old quota
policies,  with  all  their  implications.
Moreover,  there is also danger that we could
eventually  substitute  most  of our  foreign
supplies  with  domestic  production,  with  a
market share arrangement worked out among
the  various  groups  of domestic  producers.
Avoiding  such import  substitution is  a major
challenge  if we  are to make  efficient  use of
our resources.
In the  case  of dairy,  we join  many  other
countries  in  having  a  serious  adjustment
problem.  Stocks  of dairy  products  in  gov-
ernment hands are rather large.  The optimis-
tic outlook for beef prices  may help bring this
sector  into balance.  But it is still useful to ask
whether  a  more  appropriate  policy  for  the
dairy  sector  might  be  devised. 2 Would  the
use of target prices  and deficiency  payments
bring  about  a  more  rapid  adjustment  to
changing  economic  conditions,  thereby  pro-
tecting  producers  while  at  the  same  time
permitting  consumers  to  benefit  from  lower
prices?  Does  the  present  combination  of
price  supports and marketing  orders  give us
the most effective means of providing income
support to dairy farmers? Those are the kinds
of questions  we must answer  to be sure  that
present policies  are on the right track.  Simi-
lar  questions apply to the other commodities
mentioned  above.
2.  Can we do  better than cost of produc-
tion as a guide to price policy? We  have al-
ready  seen  that cost of production has  many
of the  same  difficulties  associated  with  the
concept  of parity prices.  There are measure-
ment  problems,  difficulties  in  agreeing  on
the  appropriate  concept  of cost,  and  a con-
tinuing  political  vulnerability.3 The  chal-
lenge here,  of course,  is to disconnect  com-
pletely the commodity price policies from in-
come policies,  since to defend cost of produc-
tion is  implicitly  to provide  income  support
2For recent policy studies of the dairy sector,  see  Babb,
Fallert and Buxton,  Hallberg  and Fallert,  Manchester,
and Novakovic  and Thompson.
3For a discussion of these problems,  see  Schuh (1976a).
through the product market.  Such disconnec-
tion would provide both  a more efficient use
of our resources,  and possibly permit a more
effective  means  of dealing  with  the  income
problem.  But as this audience  is well aware,
most groups in  society  would  rather  receive
their  transfer  payments  in  implicit  form
through  the  product  market  rather  than  in
the  form  of direct  payments  from  the  gov-
ernment.
Our objective  in price  policy  should  be to
assure  that  the  markets  operate  to  allocate
resources efficiently,  without creating serious
adjustment  problems.  Obviously,  some  of
the  large  price  swings  of  recent  years
provided price "noise"  rather than allocative
signals  and led to distortions in resource  use.
An  optimal  price  policy  would  leave  prices
free  to operate  within  that  range consistent
with  orderly  adjustments  as  seen  from  a
long-run perspective.  The questions  then be-
come:  How  do we  identify the proper floors
and ceilings,  and what  are  the  institutional
alternatives  for implementing  them?
3.  Can we manage the reserve stocks in a
fashion consistent with  a  true  buffer-stock
policy?  The  principle  of  buffer-stocks  is
clear.  Production  is removed  from  the  mar-
ket  when prices  are  low,  and  released  back
into the market when prices exceed a certain
level.  The  dampened  price  fluctuations
which  result  are  expected  to  lead  to  more
efficient  resource  use,  and if managed  in  an
international  context,  can  be  expected  to
promote  trade  since  they  reduce  the incen-
tive  for  other  countries  to  become  self-
sufficient.
The  difference  between  principle  and
reality  is great,  however.  First,  there  is the
challenge  of understanding  enough  about
international  agriculture  and  international
commodity markets  to  know how to manage
the  reserves  in  a  rational  fashion,  even  if
there were no political difficulties.  In the ab-
sence of proper management,  reserves can in
fact  be destabilizing.  Equally as important  is
the question of whether the political process
will permit the reserves  to be released when
prices  reach  the trigger levels.  The fact that
most stocks  are held  in producer hands  will
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attenuate this problem somewhat since, indi-
vidually,  the producers  will be able  to  make
their  own decisions.  But the  test of our new
reserve  policy  is  still before  us.
4.  Will we in fact be willing to participate
in international  commodity agreements? Par-
ticipation  in international  agreements  is  one
means  of obtaining  more  rational  interna-
tional economic policy  and of obtaining freer
international  markets.  The  challenge  in
negotiating  such  agreements  is  to  keep  the
goals rather  modest,  and at the same time  to
obtain  equitable  sharing  arrangements.  In
fact,  the justification  for participating in such
agreements  is  to attain  these  goals.  We may
have to give up some discretion over our own
policies  to  obtain  these  benefits.  Con-
sequently,  the  benefits  must  outweigh  the
costs.  The  challenge  will  be  to  devise  such
policies  so  that the  benefits  to  participating
countries  provide  the  incentive  for  them  to
follow the rules  of the game.
Income  Policy
In the past,  commodity programs were the
primary  means  of  dealing  with  the  income
problem  in  agriculture.  Interestingly
enough,  they  also  provided  the  means
whereby  we started  to deal with  the income
problem  in  the  nonfarm  sector  in  a  rather
unique  and  important  way.  Surplus  com-
modities that accumulated  in the hands of the
government were disposed of in part through
the food stamp program.  And the food stamp
program  eventually  became  an  important
component of our welfare  program.
The policy instruments for dealing with the
income  problem  both  in  agriculture  and  in
society  at  large  are  experiencing  almost  as
much  evolutionary  change  as  are  our  com-
modity  programs.  Moreover,  most
economists  would judge these  changes  to be
in the  right direction.
The  rationalization  of  these  two  sets  of
policies  is  not  completely  independent,  of
course.  A gradual shift is occurring away from
dealing  with  perceived  income  problems
through  interventions  in  the  product  mar-
kets,  and a growing emphasis  is being placed
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on dealing  with them in  a more  appropriate
way either  by policies  directed  at the factor
markets  or by direct  income transfers.
Fortunately,  the  United  States  so  far has
avoided the explicit use of product price pol-
icy as the primary  means to keep the price of
food  low  for  domestic  consumers,  a  policy
approach  that  is  common  in  advanced  coun-
tries  such  as  Great  Britain  and  Norway,  as
well  as  in  many  low-income  countries.  It  is
true that the over-valued  dollar of the 1950's
and 1960's kept the domestic price of agricul-
tural  products  lower  than  its  international
opportunity  cost  [Schuh,  1974].  But  the
over-valued  dollar  did not reflect an  explicit
desire  to  channel  agricultural  output  to  the
domestic  economy,  as  has  been  the  case  in
countries  such  as  Brazil  [Bergsman,  1970].
Moreover,  a sustained public commitment  to
agricultural  research,  extension,  and  educa-
tion assured a continued  flow of new produc-
tion  and  marketing  innovations  which
provided  sources  of income  streams  to  pro-
ducers.  These  new income streams  offset,  at
least  in  part,  the  income  lost  through  low
market prices.  The price support programs  of
this  period also acted  to counter-balance  the
deleterious  effects  of the  exchange  rate  pol-
icy.
Over the last  15  years,  of course,  the food
stamp  program  has  evolved  as  the  primary
means of assuring an adequate  supply of food
to low-income  groups.4 Originally  devised  as
a means  of disposing of  surplus production,
this  program  has  now  reached  the  point
where  it has  many of the  characteristics  of a
negative  income  tax.  An  important  strength
of  this program,  of course,  is that it  reduces
the  tendency  to  lower  agricultural  product
prices as  a means  of dealing with the income
problems  of  consumers,  and  thereby
provides  more opportunity for prices  to fulfill
their  allocatory function.  This is an important
gain.
We have not been  so wise or fortuitous  on
the  side  of dealing  with  producer  income
40ther  feeding programs  include  the school  lunch  pro-
grams  and the programs  for lactating  and pregnant  wo-
men.
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problems,  however.  But as noted above,  pol-
icy has evolved in a rational direction  here as
well.  The  introduction  of deficiency  pay-
ments  with  the  1973  farm  legislation,  and
their ratification  and extension with the 1977
omnibus  bill,  has  enabled  us  to  take  some
strides  in disconnecting  price policy from  in-
come maintenance  programs.  The severance
is far from complete,  however,  and events of
this past year suggest that such disconnection
as we  do  have is at  best tenuous.
The  gradual  extension  of  manpower  and
social welfare programs to agriculture and the
rural sector in the late  1960's and early 1970's
provided the opportunity to move away from
product price  policy as  the primary means of
dealing with  the income problems  of agricul-
ture.  The  programs  evolving  from  the  1977
legislation,  with  the  price  bands  cir-
cumscribed  by loan  rates and reserve release
rates,  combined with  a subsidized system  of
grain  reserves,  holds  promise  of providing
income  stability  to  commercial  agriculture.
However,  we  still have  a  long way  to go  in
dealing  with  the secular income  problem  of
agriculture,  or  with  income  problems  re-
flected  in  resources  that  have  become  mar-
ginal  to agriculture.  The major challenges we
face  in  the  decade  ahead  still  lie  in  these
areas.
Explicit recognition  that the income prob-
lem  of  commercial  agriculture  is  different
than the proverty problem of rural America  is
an important step in devising  a more rational
policy.  We have  made considerable  progress
in this direction,  although it is disappointing
to  see  the  extent  to  which  we  discuss  the
income  problem  without  recognizing  that
well  over  50  percent  of the  income  of farm
people  comes  from  non-farm  sources.
Clearly,  this  is  a  case  where  our  sectoral
perspective  creates  problems.5
5'Discussions  of the  1977  legislation  were  almost devoid
of any recognition of the importance of nonfarm sources
of income,  or  of the simple proposition  that  it is  family
income from all sources  that is important in understand-
ing the equity  question,  not the  income  from  agricul-
tural  sources  above.
In turning  to the secular  income problem
of agriculture,  it  seems  fair  to  say  that  the
development  process  as  experienced  in  the
United States has been quite wasteful of both
human  resources  and  physical  capital.  We
have  probably  depended  excessively  on  re-
gional  migration  to bring  about  equilibrium
in the labor market,  not recognizing that the
externalities  associated  with  this  process
cause  it  to  be  largely  self-defeating.'  The
selective  nature  of the  migration  process
causes  the labor  exporting  region  to  lose  its
human  capital,  its  young,  its  vital  and
entrepreneurial,  and  with  them  whatever
mobile capital  they have.  What is  left behind
are  the  aged,  those who  cannot compete  in
the non-farm  sector,  and fixed capital  whose
productivity  inevitably  declines  with  the
outmigration  of labor.  It is little wonder that
it  took  roughly  100  years  for  the  South  to
reach  something  approaching  an  equilib-
rium,  or  that other  pockets  of poverty have
stayed with us for such  a long time.
A  more  rational  policy  would  reduce  the
burden  that labor  has  to bear in adjusting to
changing  economic  conditions,  and  make
greater  use  of  capital  flows  as  a  means  of
reaching  equilibrium.  A  greater  emphasis
would  be  placed  on  taking  new  industry to
areas  of  excess  labor,  and  greater  attention
would  be  given  to  devising  an  explicit  loca-
tional policy.
The  goal of such  a policy  would  not be to
reduce  sectoral  mobility.  To the contrary,  it
might well increase  sectoral  mobility  since it
would  reduce  the need for geographic  dislo-
cation  to  obtain  alternative  employment.
This  would  reduce  both  the  pecuniary  and
psychic  costs  of changing jobs.  Similarly,  it
would  not  lead  to  a  geographically  less  effi-
cient allocation of resources.  Rather,  it would
provide  for  a more  efficient use  of resources
in  the  aggregate,  by  reducing  the  negative
externalities  that  our  past policies  have  im-
posed  on  both  supplying  and  receiving  re-
gions.
6For a more ample discussion  of this problem,  see Schuh
(forthcoming).
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New policies of this kind are still desirable
even though the sectoral  transfer of labor re-
sources  out  of agriculture  is nearing  an end.
Economic conditions will continue to change,
and with these changes there will be continu-
ing need for  resource  adjustment.  The  chal-
lenge  is  to  advise  spatial-locational  policies
that will facilitate those adjustments,  and that
provide a means of internalizing the negative
externalities. 7
Finally,  a  more  general  negative  income
tax would  appear to offer considerable  prom-
ise for dealing with the chronic income prob-
lem  of agriculture.  Data collected  from  the
rural income  maintenance  experiments  indi-
cate the extent to which rural poor are illiter-
ate,  undereducated,  and  unskilled  [Palmer
and Peckman].  The experiments also provide
some  evidence  that  income  maintenance
programs  encourage  the  accumulation  of
human  capital by the disadvantaged  families
in forms ranging from improved nutrition,  to
additional  schooling,  and to improved means
for job  search  and  labor  market  mobility
[Schuh,  1978].  This  accumulation  of human
capital  ultimately provides the means of deal-
ing with the poverty problem.
Trade and Exchange  Rate Policy
The  role and importance  of exchange rate
policy  are  being  increasingly  recognized.
Eight  of the  nine  member  countries  of  the
European  Economic  Community  have
adopted  "green"  currencies  - an  explicit
multiple  exchange  rate  system  - as  the
means of opting out of the proposed common
price policy of the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy  (CAP).  The  Japanese  recognize  that  the
rising value  of the  yen  is  shifting the  com-
parative  advantage  of  their  productive  sec-
tors  relative  to ours.  And,  the  President of
the German  Central Bank has recognized the
competitive  threat posed  by  less-developed
countries that keep their currency tied to the
U.S.  dollar.
7The spatial-location  dimensions  to the problem  of rural
poverty was recognized  by  Schultz  some 25 years ago.
His seminal ideas have given rise to a rather large body
of empirical  research  both on  U.S.  agriculture  and on
the agriculture  of other countries.
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Yet many of the implications  of a flexible
exchange rate system are not yet fully under-
stood and thereby continue to pose important
challenges  to  U.S.  agricultural  policy.  For
example,  there has been  little recognition to
date  that  over-and  under-valued  currencies
constitute implicit  subsidies  and taxes to im-
ports  and  exports.  The  multilateral  trade
negotiations,  for  example,  have  given  little
attention  to  exchange  rate  policy.  Yet  an
under-valued  currency,  like  Japan's  has
been,  is  as  surely  a  tariff on  imports  and  a
subsidy  on  exports  as are  the  more  explicit
varieties of tariffs and subsidies. What does it
avail  us  to  negotiate  acceptable  policies  on
explicit tariffs and subsidies,  if we ignore the
implicit forms?
A  system  of  flexible  exchange  rates  has
important implications for both U.S.  agricul-
tural policy and macroeconomic policy.  With
such a regime of exchange rates the response
to  monetary  policy  resides  primarily  in the
trade  sectors:  import  competing and exports
(for  details,  see  Schuh,  1977).  Therefore,  to
the extent that domestic stabilization  policies
are implemented  by monetary  means - and
that is  the primary means  we  are now  using
- agriculture  as  an export sector will bear a
disproportionate  share  of  the  adjustment
burden  to  changing  monetary  policy.  Such
adjustments are brought about by changes  in
the exchange  rate  induced  by  capital flows.
The capital flows  occur in response  to chang-
ing conditions  in  the  domestic  money  mar-
kets.
For  agriculture  this  means  more  instabil-
ity,  caused  by  shifts  in  foreign  demand.
Given  the  well-recognized  long  lags  in  re-
sponse  to monetary policy,  on the one hand,
and the similar lags in response  to changes in
the exchange  rate on the other hand,  the dif-
ficulties of dealing with the  instability in  ag-
riculture  will  indeed  be  severe.  Perhaps
more  importantly,  attempts  to  alleviate  the
implied  price  instability  in  agriculture  by
such  means  as  buffer  stocks  will  neutralize
the  intended  effects of monetary policy.
Finally,  exogenous  shifts  in the  exchange
rate can impose severe adjustment problems
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on  agriculture.  Perhaps  the  best way  to ap-
preciate  this  is to  recognize  that  agriculture
has been a beneficiary  of the OPEC-induced
increase  in  petroleum  prices.  The  huge  in-
crease in our import bill has caused the dollar
to decline  in  foreign exchange  markets.  This
has  strengthened  the competitive  advantage
of our agricultural products  abroad,  and con-
tributed  to the  high levels  at which  our ag-
ricultural  exports  have  remained  despite
bumper world crops in recent years.
If the  petroleum  cartel  should  break  up,
the dollar would undoubtedly  rise as  our oil-
import bill  declined.  The competitive poten-
tial of our agricultural exports would then de-
cline,  and  unless  there  were  offsetting  de-
velopments our agricultural sector would face
another  severe  adjustment  problem.  Such a
development  would  pose a serious  challenge
to agricultural  policy.
Our challenges  in trade  policy are equally
numerous  and complex. Agriculture  has ben-
efited  from  the  substantial  liberalization  in
trade  policy  that  has  taken  place  in  the
post-World War II period.  But the potential
for  further  liberalization  is quite  great.  The
levels  of agricultural  protection  are  much
higher  than  are  the  levels  of  industrial  pro-
tection. Yet the world tends to deplore indus-
trial  protectionism  while  regarding  agricul-
tural protectionism  as perfectly  normal.
Protection  of domestic agriculture  in  most
countries  causes  agricultural  output  to  be
produced  in the  wrong places,  thereby rais-
ing  its  cost  and  sacrificing  output  potential
[Johnson,  1974].  Such  protection  prevents
market  adjustments  from  taking place,  with
the  result that  relatively  small  shifts  in  de-
mand or supply in international markets  lead
to  rather  large  price  fluctuations  [Johnson,
1975].  Given  the  relative  openness  of our
own agricultural  sector,  that sector as well as
its  consumers  have  to  bear  an  important
share of the  adjustment burden from  chang-
ing conditions  in international markets.
The  immediate  challenge  is  to  encourage
liberalization  in  agricultural  trade  policy  in
the  current  round  of multilateral  trade
negotiations.  The lack of success to date does
not bode well.  But try we  must.
Three  factors  complicate  any  attempts  to
obtain  trade  liberalization  for  agricultural
products.  The  first  is  the  growing  wave  of
protectionism  both  here  and  abroad.  This
drive for protectionism  is due in part to slug-
gish  growth  rates  among  the  industrialized
countries.  But the rapid shifts in comparative
advantage due to exchange  rate realignments
and  the  emergence  of some  middle  range
economic  powers  such  as  South  Korea,
Taiwan,  and  Brazil  have  also  played  an  im-
portant role.
A  second  factor  that  retards  agricultural
trade  liberalization  is  the  growing tendency
to self-sufficiency  in agriculture among many
countries.  The  instability  of international
commodity markets has encouraged this ten-
dency.  But the perceived  potential for  deal-
ing with regional  or  sector adjustment prob-
lems by means of import substitution policies
also plays an important  role.
Unfortunately,  the  ill-advised  rhetoric  of
U.S.  policy-makers  and intellectuals also  has
to accept its proper share of the blame.  Con-
cern with the world food problem has caused
us  all too often to  promote self-sufficiency  in
food  production  as  a  desirable  policy  goal.
But  self-sufficiency  should  not  be  confused
with the quite appropriate goal of strengthen-
ing and developing the agricultural sector.  In
fact,  modernization  and  development  of ag-
riculture can,  and often times should, lead to
an increased  dependence  on trade.
A final factor that retards a liberalization  in
agricultural  trade  is the failure  to devise and
implement positive adjustment policies.  Ex-
panded  trade  almost  inevitably  imposes
rather  severe  adjustment  problems  on  par-
ticular  groups  in  society.  The  difficulty  of
dealing  with  these  adjustment  problems
eventually  leads  to protectionism.  Our  own
track record on this issue is not very good,  as
witnessed by our dairy policies.  Ironically we
have seldom  used the considerable  trade ad-
justment policy  instruments provided  in the
1974 Trade Adjustment  Act.
The  high  protective  tariffs  the  European
Community maintains for its agricultural sec-
tor are a reflection of its unwillingness to deal
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with  adjustment  problems.  Unfortunately,
the  Community  has  taken  a  step  back from
the  common  prices  it  had  established  by
1968. That set of common prices would have
encouraged some necessary adjustments. The
use  of  green  currencies  has  destroyed  that
important  element  of the  CAP,  and  at  the
same  time  reduced  the  pressure  for  adjust-
ment.
A means of dealing more directly with the
adjustment  problem  is  needed.  Here  the
challenge  to  our  capability  for  institutional
innovation  is great.  For example,  it might be
useful  to  have  an  International  Adjustment
Fund that would help  to finance projects  de-
signed  to  facilitate  the  adjustment  process.
The  rationale  for  such  a  Fund  is  that  the
world  at  large  benefits  from  freer  world
trade.  Yet an  individual  country finds  it  dif-
ficult  to  internalize  the  political  trade-off
since  the economic  exchange  is  seldom  per-
ceived  as  between  domestic  producers  and
domestic consumers,  but  rather as  a loss  by
domestic  producers  to the  benefit of foreign
producers.
An international  institution would perhaps
have  a better  chance  of bringing about posi-
tive adjustment policies  than would domestic
institutions.  It would  be perceived  as bring-
ing  in  resources  from  outside  to  deal  with
what  is  commonly  viewed  as  a  problem
whose source is external.  The capital for such
a Fund  could  be provided  from  a small levy
based  on the GNP of individual countries -
perhaps  the  closest  measure  of consumer
benefits  one  could find.
The details  of such  a proposal would  take
us  rather  far  afield  for  now.  However,  the
concept  is  nothing more  than  an  application
of the well-known  compensation  principle  of
welfare  economics  fame,  with  the  objective
being  to  provide  actual  compensation.  Ag-
riculture would be a likely beneficiary of such
a proposal for it,  more than perhaps  any other
industry,  has  highly  specialized  resources
8The high specificity  of agricultural resources  is due not
so much  to the  specificity  of labor and entrepreneurial
skills,  as to the  complex of factors associated with land,
including temperature,  rainfall,  and daylight.
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and  thus  provides  the  economic  basis  for
profitable  trade.8
Foreign assistance is an important aspect of
our trade policy.  The challenges for this pol-
icy are  also numerous.  Despite  the substan-
tial involvement  of the United  States  in the
world  economy,  we  remain  surprisingly
parochial  in  our  policies  toward  that
economy.  We  fret  over foreign  investments
in  our  economy,  when  we  ourselves  are  a
major  investor  abroad.  We  complain  about
competitive  threats  from  abroad,  when  we
ourselves  are a major exporter,  and must con-
tinue  to export  if we are  to  import  essential
raw materials.  We pride ourselves on our be-
nevolence  with foreign  aid.  However,  if our
contribution  is  measured  as  a  share  of our
GNP,  we  rank  12th  among  the  14  indus-
trialized countries,  and have ranked that low
for a long period  of time.
I would  like  to single  out two  of our chal-
lenges  with  foreign  assistance  for  attention
today. The first is the problem of raising  our
commitment  to  foreign  aid.  Unfortunately,
we tend to view foreign assistance as benevo-
lence,  when in fact  it  should  more  properly
be  viewed  as  an  investment.  Viewed  very
pragmatically,  markets  for  our products  will
grow  only  as  per  capita  incomes  in  other
countries  grow.  The  greatest  potential  for
such growth,  of course,  is among those coun-
tries  with  the  lowest  per  capita  income.
Somewhat less pragmatically,  but no less im-
portant,  development  efforts  abroad lead  to
resource  development,  expanded supplies  of
raw material and production  technology,  and
synergistic  creativity.  We  ignore  these  po-
tentials  at our own risk.
The  second  challenge  has  to  do  with  the
form and policy emphasis that our foreign as-
sistance  takes.  In  the  process  of reforming
our foreign assistance  programs we may have
gone  overboard  in  our  emphasis  on  "basic
needs." This  is not to quarrel with the desire
to help the poorest of the poor. It is to ques-
tion  whether  we  are  treating  symptoms
rather  than  dealing  with  more  basic  causal
factors.  Agriculture  now  tends  to  be viewed
as  an  employer  of  last  resort,  when  both
theory  and  empirical  evidence  suggest  that
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agriculture  will  be  a  declining  share  of a
growing  economy  [Johnston,  1970].  We pro-
pose  to deal with the equity problem by land
reform, while ignoring the well-tested tenets
of human capital theory, with its precept that
the  distribution  of  human  capital  is  more
important  than  the  distribution  of  physical
capital.  Moreover,  we  channel  our  limited
resources  to  large  numbers  of  localized  de-
velopment  projects,  while  failing  to  recog-
nize  the  importance  of economic  policies,
and  that  such  policies  in  most  low  income
countries  discriminate  severely  against  rural
people.
Finally,  we  ascribe  too  easily  to the  false
dichotomy  between  equity  and  efficiency.
Our proper concern  with the equity problem
causes us  to take  an almost perverse  pride in
ignoring efficiency considerations.  At times it
appears that we would deliberately turn away
from a project if it were found to rank high on
efficiency  grounds.
Perhaps  the  best  example  of  such  policy
making  is  when  we withdraw  our assistance
from  countries  like  Brazil  at  the  very  time
that our past investments  have the potential
for  a high  pay-off.  Such  failure  to  capitalize
on  our  past  investments  seems  quite  short
sighted.  Moreover,  it amounts  to viewing an
economy in the narrow perspective of its own
limits,  and  failing  to see how  it  fits into  the
larger world economy.  In light of the scarcity
of  resources  available  for  international  de-
velopment,  it  would  seem  proper  to  apply
the efficiency criterion  to our developmental
investments  in order to consider the marginal
rate  of return,  despite  our ultimate  interest
in  equity.
A Food  and Agriculture Policy?
Much  has been written and said about the
need for a food and agriculture policy;  some-
thing that goes beyond a narrow focus  on the
production  sector alone.  The case for such an
approach  is  clear,  despite  the  stresses  and
strains  which it causes.  There are problems,
however,  both in articulating what a food and
agriculture policy  involves,  and in  managing
the  political  and  policy-making  challenges
which it presents.  Let  me  make a few  com-
ments on  each problem.
The distinguishing  characteristic  of a food
and agriculture policy  is that it covers  the full
range  of activities  from  the  consumption  of
food, through processing and distribution  ac-
tivities,  production,  and the supply of inputs
to  all  sectors  considered.  Viewed  domesti-
cally,  a  food  and  agriculture  policy  would
cover what  is  often  referred  to  as  the  food
chain.  But to be  complete  it should  include
the  trade  sector  as  well,  since  even  a major
agricultural  exporter  such  as  the  United
States  imports  an important  share of its food
consumption.
Clearly  the articulation  of such  a policy  is
more difficult than a narrow focus on agricul-
ture alone.  In the first instance it means that
consumer  interests become an important pol-
icy  issue.  The regulatory  aspect  of consumer
policies  has,  of course,  been  an  important
source  of controversy  in  recent years,  as  has
been  the difficult challenge  of attempting  to
account  for nutritional  considerations.
But a  properly  defined  food  and  agricul-
ture  policy  involves  more  than  just  adding
consumer  interests  to  producer  consid-
erations.  It  involves  a  consideration  of  the
product  marketing chain,  with  all the recent
issues that have been raised  about concentra-
tion ratios  and possible  anti-trust  actions.  It
involves the  ever-more  important  supply  in-
dustries.  And  it  involves  consideration  of
trade.
Agricultural  economists  have  long  recog-
nized  the  importance  of  taking  this  broad
perspective,  even  though  often  the  case  is
made  more  from  the standpoint  of develop-
ing  their  own  employment  opportunities
than  from  any  notion  that  it  would  lead  to
sounder  policy.  But  a  food  and  agriculture
perspective  has  now  become  a  political  im-
perative.  Both  the 1973 and 1977 legislations
were  titled  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Act,
with all its implications.  Moreover,  that legis-
lation was  passed in  each case as a result of a
political  coalition of consumer,  labor, and ag-
ricultural  interests.  Even  if  policy  makers
were inclined to resume a narrower producer
perspective,  it would  not be possible.
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But the political reality of the coalition that
produced the current legislation  is a very dif-
ferent matter from the reality of bureaucratic
politics, which  has a major impact on the day
to day making and implementation  of policy. 9
The  challenge  here,  and  it  is  a  severe  chal-
lenge,  is to keep the attempt to serve such  a
broad  range  of interest groups from  paralyz-
ing the decision-making  process.
There are no easy answers to this problem.
But the issue is important,  especially in light
of current efforts  to reorganize  the Washing-
ton  bureaucracy.  At  one level  the  question
concerns  whether  a Secretary of Agriculture
can  provide  the  political  trade-off  between
consumer,  producer,  and  other  interests.
Would each  set of interests be better served
if they had an individual  spokesman, with the
President  alone making  the difficult political
trade-offs?  Our  neighbor  to  the  north,
Canada,  has something like such an  arrange-
ment,  with  consumer  interests  in  particular
having their own Cabinet member.  But then
Canada  also  has  about  32  members  in  its
Cabinet.
Interesting  enough,  the broad perspective
that the U.S. Department of Agriculture now
takes in its policy responsibilities  is unique in
our present governmental structure. Our pol-
icy  interests  include  consumer  affairs,  rural
development,  resources  and  environment,
research,  teaching,  and  extension,  the  com-
modity  programs,  and  various  aspects  of
international  policy.  However,  the  Depart-
ment  does  not  have  responsibility  for  some
aspects  of land and water policy,  which come
under the purview of the Department of the
Interior.
The broad  responsibility for  rural America
that has  emerged  in  the  Department  of Ag-
riculture,  and  its  current  coverage  of the
entire  food  chain,  is  unique  in  the  Federal
government.  No other Department attempts
to  integrate  such  a  broad  range  of  policy
interests.  Ironically,  some  of  the  current
proposals  for  reorganization  would  do  away
with  this rather  unique  integrated approach
9For  a fascinating  account of such politics,  see  Heclo.
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both to the  rural  sector  and to  food and  ag-
riculture.
An important challenge  of the agricultural
establishment in the decade ahead will be to
maintain  that  broad  perspective  on  the  ag-
ricultural sector,  and to capitalize on the po-
tential  it  offers  for  developing  a  cohesive,
mutually  reinforcing  policy  towards  rural
America.  Our legacy of the  past is  an  inher-
ent  producer  bias  in  the  career  service  of
the Department.  An important  challenge  of
the future is  to broaden that perspective to a
degree consistent with our organizational  and
Congressionally  mandated  interests,  and  to
develop the leadership  than can sustain  that
perspective,  politically and economically.
A Concluding  Comment
In  conclusion  I  would  like  to  make  one
final point.  Economists  have for too long ne-
glected the G in our macroeconomic models.
We fail to understand why policy is what it is,
and we  leave the  study of the policy-making
process  to the  students of political science.
Implicit  in  my  discussion  of  policy  chal-
lenges  is a search for a better understanding
of the  bases  of economic  policy.  To  neglect
why policy takes its particular form is to fail to
understand  an  important  part  of the  eco-
nomic world  in  which  we live.  Similarly,  to
neglect  the  policy process  per se is  to abdi-
cate our responsibilities  in obtaining more ra-
tional policy.  Our tasks as economists will not
be finished  until we  close  these two  impor-
tant gaps in  our knowledge.
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